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PROGRESS REPORT

FIRST COURT-MARTIAL SCREENING PROGRAM PILOT STUDY

Project 6X-97-87-001
Task 6-60-01-022

MENTAL HYGIENE CONSULTATION SERVICE

FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

1 July 1961 to 1 September 1962

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Captain MSC USA
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Responsible Investigator

Reports Control Symbol CSCRD-16

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

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ABSTRACT

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MENTAL HYGIENE CONSULTATION SERVICE
Department of Neuropsychiatry
Womack Army Hospital
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Progress Report - 1 July 1961 to 1 September 1962

by

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The value of routine screening and treatment of first court-martial offenders was studied by evaluating performance for six months after trial. Neither evaluation nor treatment led to any improvement in performance. One-quarter of the offenders were discharged for ineffectiveness within six months, whether or not they received help. It was administratively impossible to treat offenders promptly, because of delayed reporting of offenses, broken appointments, and the offenders' lack of motivation for help. Individual treatment of offenders had little effect, while the way the unit handled the men had much greater effect. It was concluded it would be more effective to identify units with high offense rates and consult with unit leaders and personnel to help them handle offenders more effectively. Such a program would help all men in the units where help was needed most, and would avoid the huge administrative load involved in screening all offenders from all units.

Offenses were most common among soldiers who were young, poorly educated, single, low in rank, of limited service, and Negro. Those who performed ineffectively after trial had the poorest performance before trial, measured by character and efficiency ratings, AWOL's, transfers, sick calls, Articles 15, and commanders' ratings. They also had poorer adjustment in school, work, health, and pre-service delinquency, and had lower Personal History Oa-1 scores and higher Pd and Sc scores.

Performance after trial was predicted best by performance ratings made at the time of trial by commanders and the MHCS staff. Low ratings correctly identified more than 40% of the potential ineffectives, and misidentified fewer than 10% of the effectives.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The professional staff which discussed these offenders during staff conferences and carried out the treatment program included the following officers:

Lt. Col. Jay F. Tuttle, MC, USA, Psychiatrist
Captain Sanford Meyerowitz, MC, USAR, Psychiatrist
Captain James N. McClure, Jr., MC, USAR, Psychiatrist
Captain Alan Dobrow, MC, USAR, Psychiatrist
Major Edward F. Krise, MSC, USA, Psychiatric Social Worker
Captain James Timmens, MSC, USA, Psychiatric Social Worker
2nd Lt. William D. Sudduth, MSC, USAR, Psychiatric Social Worker
Captain Robert S. Nichols, MSC, USA, Clinical Psychologist

The social histories were obtained by the following members of the enlisted staff of the Psychiatric Social Service Section:

M/Sgt. Norvell H. Long
Sgt. Benito DeJesus
SP-4 Herbert Kutchins
SP-4 Edgar S. Huffman
SP-4 Paul H. Post
SP-4 Douglas Newman
PFC Luis Rivera
SP-5 Thomas A. Hammond
PFC Regina Rinehart
SP-5 Thomas Kassabaum
SP-5 Lee Woods

The work of obtaining data from the offenders' unit, scheduling patients, testing them, maintaining records, and performing preliminary analysis of the data was carried out by the following enlisted men working in the Clinical Psychology Section:

S/Sgt. Emmett J. Allen
SP-4 George Rice
SP-4 John Hayward
SP-4 Robert Updyke
SP-4 James B. Rainforth
SP-4 Herbert Ryen
SP-4 Allen M. Douglas
SP-4 Ernest Mayberry
SP-5 Lewis Cook
Pvt. Richard Harper
SP-4 Thomas Smith
SP-4 Joseph Arnette
PFC Lawrence Syzchulski
PFC Leonard Moore
PFC Joel Zaientz

The statistical work in this report was done partially with electronic data processing machines. The programming was done by SP-5 Harry Orlich of the 344th Data Processing Unit. Other personnel of this unit did valuable work in punching cards and performing data tabulations. The final statistical computations were done by PFC Moore and PFC Zaientz.

Dr. Oscar A. Parsons and Dr. Grant Dahlstrom have served as consultants on the study and made valuable suggestions.

The Personal History Form and its scoring keys were provided by Mr. Adrian Dubuisson of the Army Personnel Research Office.

The heavy typing load created by this project has been very capably handled by Miss Julia Harris and Mrs. Marion Lupia.

The author is responsible for the design of the study, the administration of the project and the reporting of the results.

INTRODUCTION

It became apparent several years ago that the Army needed to do more to rehabilitate military offenders. At that time, such men generally did not receive psychological assistance or evaluation until they were sent to the post stockade. Since this was usually done only after repeated offenses, it was found most stockade prisoners had such a well-established delinquent pattern that successful rehabilitation was not possible. It was thought, therefore, that men might be helped more if they were seen when they first got into trouble. An objective criterion of being in trouble was being court-martialled for the first time. Accordingly, it was decided to screen first court-martial offenders and help them properly, in hopes of preventing further misbehavior. Such a plan was begun at a number of posts, including Fort Bragg, where the program went into operation in May of 1959.

Since this program was new and unproven, it seemed wise to test its value. Accordingly, a First Court-Martial Screening Program Pilot Study was designed and sponsorship and funds were obtained from the Army Medical Research and Development Command. The study was conducted by the Mental Hygiene Consultation Service (MHCS) staff at Fort Bragg who did the clinical work with the offenders. The responsible investigator was Captain Robert S. Nichols, MSC, Chief of the MHCS Clinical Psychology Service. This report outlines the purpose of the study, the experimental design, the status of the project, results obtained, and the conclusions reached concerning the effectiveness of the First Court-Martial Screening Program (FCMSP).

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The main purpose of the study was to see whether offenders performed better after their first court-martial if they received prompt psychological evaluation and were then given whatever help seemed indicated. The study was also designed to answer several secondary questions:

1. How do first court-martial offenders differ from average soldiers in their personality and performance?

2. Among what sub-groups in the military are first court-martial offenses most common?

3. Are there any measures of personality, social history, personal characteristics or other relevant factors which will successfully predict which first court-martial offenders will show improved performance after being court-martialled and which offenders will continue to perform poorly?

The FCMSP was designed so that answers to all of the preceding questions could be sought.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The experimental sample consists of 465 male, enlisted first court-martial offenders who were court-martialled at Fort Bragg during the period from September 1959 to June 1961. The sample was obtained by identifying a random 30% sample of all first court-martial offenders, those chosen being the ones whose serial numbers ended in 1, 2, or 3. It was necessary to see only a fraction of the

available offenders because these men were seen in addition to routine MHCS patients and the MHCS was unable to deal with more than 30% of the offenders with the available time and staff.

A total of 641 offenders were identified for possible inclusion in the 30% sample, but it was possible to get complete initial data on only 465 or 73% of them. The remaining 176 (27%) could not be included for a variety of reasons given in Table I. It will be seen that most cases (N=92) had to be dropped because they were transferred or completed their normal tour of duty before their initial workup could be completed. Some (N=46) had to be dropped because they were deserters or were administratively separated under the provisions of AR's 635-206, 635-208, and 635-209. The remainder were not seen for a variety of administrative reasons. A review of the reasons for not being able to complete the initial evaluation does not suggest any major source of bias in the selection of the sample, and the 465 cases seen represent a high percentage of all the 641 cases that could have been seen so it is concluded that the offenders seen in this study are typical of all men who received first courts-martial at Fort Bragg between September 1959 and June 1961.

Once an offender was identified, a visit was made to his unit, where data were obtained from his personal and health records concerning his personal characteristics and past performance. In addition, his commanding officer and supervising non-commissioned officer were asked to rate his past and future performance and his potential value as a soldier.

Once these data were obtained, the offenders were randomly assigned to one of three groups of approximately equal size, designated the control group, mock experimental group, and actual experimental group. Men in the control group were never seen and received no assistance, but were followed up six months later. Men in the two experimental groups were brought to the clinic, interviewed for a social history and given psychological tests, after which the professional staff (consisting of at least one psychologist, one psychiatrist, and one social worker) reviewed all the data and then recommended what help the man should receive. Once the decision was made, the man was randomly assigned to the mock experimental group, in which case he did not receive the recommended help, or to the actual experimental group, in which case he did receive the recommended help. It will be noted that the staff never knew ahead of time whether or not the offender would receive the assistance recommended for him.

At the end of six months, a follow-up was made on all offenders in all three groups to determine the quality of their performance during the 6 months and their status at the end of the period.

The treatment recommended for each man was based on the merits of each case and the same method was not used for all men. Possible recommendations included individual psychotherapy, environmental manipulation (such as transfer or retraining), referral to other agencies (such as Red Cross or Judge Advocate) or elimination from the service. Sometimes several of these methods were applied to the same case. Therefore, this study was not intended to measure the value of any one treatment method, but rather it was to determine whether the <u>prompt application</u> of customary treatment procedures improved the subsequent performance of the offender.

The design of the study permitted several questions to be asked:

1. Does the act of testing and interviewing an offender and

TABLE I

Cases Dropped From Sample Because Of Incomplete Initial Data

Cases Subject to Inclusion:	641	
Cases Included:	465	(73%)
Cases Not Included - Initial Data Couldn't Be completed or Case Not Appropriate For Inclusion:	176	(27%)
	641	

Reason for Incompleteness of Initial Data	Number of Cases	% of Total Unused Cases
1. Transferred before evaluation complete	59	33.4
2. Completed tour of duty honorably before evaluation	41	23.3
3. Deserted	21	11.9
4. Eliminated under provisions of AR 635-208	20	11.4
5. Eliminated under provisions of AR 635-209	3	1.7
6. Eliminated under provisions of AR 635-206	2	1.1
7. Dropped because of previous court-martial	16	9.1
8. Received hardship discharge	4	2.3
9. In civilian jail, unavailable for evaluation	2	1.1
10. No personnel records available	4	2.3
11. Transferred to Disciplinary Barracks, Leavenworth	1	.6
12. Unable to see enough to take tests	1	.6
13. Court-martial was not completed	2	1.1
	176	99.9

thereby showing an interest in him improve his later performance? If so, the mock experimental group should perform better than the control group.

2. Do men who are evaluated and helped do better than those who are only evaluated? If so, the actual experimental group should perform better than the mock experimental group.

3. Is it possible to use any measure of personality or past performance to predict which offenders will perform well and which ones will not? This question could be answered by finding the relationships between the initial measures obtained on each man and his subsequent performance.

The personal and performance data obtained on offenders in all three groups consisted of the following:

1. Volunteer status (RA=volunteer, US=draftee)
2. Rank (expressed in pay grade, E-9 being the highest and E-1 the lowest)
3. Age (in years at last birthday)
4. Education (years completed before entering service)
5. Race
6. Marital status
7. Length of service (in months)
8. Military Occupational Specialty Number (MOS)
9. Military character rating (4 is highest, 1 is lowest)
10. Military efficiency rating (4 is highest, 1 is lowest)
11. Number of courts-martial during prior enlistments
12. Number of Articles 15 (mild, non-judicial punishment)
13. Previous board actions (for possible elimination from the service)
14. AWOL's (number of episodes of unauthorized absence during the current tour of duty)
15. Transfers (average number of transfers from one major unit to another per month)
16. Sick calls (average number per month of visits to some medical facility)
17. Army Classification Battery scores - including the General Technical (GT) score which was chosen as a measure of general intelligence)

18. Type of court-martial received (summary for minor offenses, special for more serious ones, general for the most serious offenses)

19. Physical health profile (A meaning no significant defects) (C being the lowest level acceptable for service)

20. Psychiatric or S profile (1 being no disability, 3 being the lowest level acceptable for military service)

21. Commissioned and non-commissioned officer rating scale. This is a 3 part rating scale on which a man was rated on his past performance (5 being highest, 1 lowest), future performance (5 high, 1 low), and potential value to the servive (4 high, 1 low). A copy of the scale, termed the CO-NCO Rating Scale, is given in Appendix I.

22. Type of offense: Civilian (an offense having a civilian equivalent, such as larceny) or military (an offense unique to the military, such as AWOL)

When men in the two experimental groups were evaluated at the Mental Hygiene Consultation Service, they were given a number of psychological tests:

1. The Personal History Form OA-1. This is a measure of attitudes and past history designed to measure potential ineffectiveness among soldiers. It is in the process of development by the Army Personnel Research Office, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C., and was used on a trial basis with special permission from that office.

2. Otis Self-Administering Test of Mental Ability (30 minute version)

3. Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)

4. California Psychological Inventory (CPI)

In addition, the social histories of the men evaluated at the clinic were read and then rated by the Chief Social Worker, Major Edward Krise, on the following dimensions (in each case 5 is the maximum rating, and 1 is the lowest):

1. Family adjustment

2. School adjustment

3. Work adjustment (before entering service)

4. Pre-service delinquency

5. Marital adjustment

6. Health

7. Military record

8. Role conflict (This was rated present (yes) or absent (no), depending on whether or not the offense in question involved a conflict between two potentially incompatible roles (such as remaining on guard versus going home to care for a sick wife.) The Social History Rating Form is shown in Appendix II.

Men evaluated at the clinic also were rated by the staff on the CO-NCO Rating Scales for past and future performance and potential value to the service. These ratings, designated MHCS ratings, represented the consensus of the staff members who had evaluated the man in question.

At the time of the six months follow-up, the following data were obtained:

1. Status at end of follow-up period. There were 7 possibilities:

   a. Still on active duty (Duty)

   b. Out of service upon satisfactory completion of normal tour of duty (ETS)

   c. Given premature separation because of severe financial or health problems in family (hardship)

   d. Separated from service for unsuitability under the provisions of AR 635-208. Such men, designated the 208 group, generally had a very poor performance record, characterized by poor motivation and frequent misbehavior.

   e. Separated from service for inadaptability under the provisions of AR 635-209. These men, designated the 209 group, lacked the stability or character to perform effectively, even though many were well motivated.

   f. Desertion (Deserter)

   g. Separated from service after conviction in civil courts, under the provisions of AR 635-206 (206 group)

It was further decided to classify duty, ETS, and hardship cases as having performed in a satisfactory manner during the 6 months follow-up period, while the 208, 209, deserter, and 206 cases were classified as having an unsatisfactory performance record.

2. CO-NCO Ratings

3. Military character ratings

4. Military efficiency ratings

5. Articles 15 (total number during man's current tour, including the 6 months followup period. This measure was used after it was found that the three study groups had equal numbers of AWOL's at the time of their first court-martial.)

6. Courts-Martial (during their entire period of service, including the 6 months follow-up period and including the first court-martial)

7. Board actions (during the entire period of service)

8. AWOL's (during the entire period of service)

9. Transfer (rate per month during the man's entire tour of duty, including the 6 months follow-up period. This method of computing

transfers was adopted only after it was determined that the average transfer rates of men in all three study groups did not differ at the time of their first court-martial).

10. Sick calls (rate per month during the man's entire tour of duty, including the 6 months follow-up period)

In addition to obtaining the above data, the experimental design had one other feature: A random sample (N=232) of 1% of the Fort Bragg population during the period of the study were identified and their personal characteristics were obtained and compared with the corresponding characteristics of offenders. This made it possible to determine how offenders differed from average soldiers and also permitted the computation of epidemiological data concerning the incidence of first courts-martial among various groups in the Fort Bragg population.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE PROJECT

All data collection for the project has been completed. The initial information on the 465 offenders was obtained between September 1959 and June 1961. The final follow-up data were obtained by December 1961.

The analysis of the characteristics of offenders and the differences between them and average soldiers is complete. The collection of epidemiological data concerning the incidence of first courts-martial is also complete. The results of both of these analyses have been reported in a progress report, issued 30 June 1961, obtainable from ASTIA (Armed Services Technical Information Agency, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington 12, Virginia), as document AD 261 001. These findings are also summarized in the present report.

The analysis has been completed concerning the effectiveness of the help given these offenders and the conclusions reached are presented in the next section of this report.

An analysis has also been made of the relationship between initial measures of personality and performance and the offenders' subsequent performance. The analysis of the data on personal characteristics, past performance, and supervisors' ratings has been completed and is reported herein, but the data on psychological test performance have not been completely analyzed and only partial conclusions are reported in this paper.

The responsible investigator of this project is being transferred and therefore further analysis of the data will not be done during the year 1962-1963. It would be desirable at some future date to analyze some of the predictive measures more thoroughly and also to investigate the relationships that exist among the various initial measures of personal characteristics, performance data, social history variables, and test results. Such an analysis was not originally intended as part of this study, but the data are available and merit further study.

RESULTS

A. Personal Characteristics of Offenders:

An investigation was made of the characteristics of the offenders, using all available data, including their personal characteristics, their past performance (measured by ratings and objective criterion), their social histories, and their performance on psychological tests. The results are presented in Tables II, III, IV, and V. It was also possible to obtain data concerning the comparable personal characteristics of a group of 232 average soldiers and where such data are available, the offenders and average soldiers are compared. Unfortunately, no data could be obtained concerning the performance, social histories, and test scores of average soldiers. Normal soldiers were compared with a

sub-sample of 202 offenders with scores equal to those of the entire 450 offenders. Average soldiers were compared with a sub-sample of 202 offenders whose scores matched those of all 450 offenders.

The typical offender is found to be a young, poorly educated, single man of low rank and limited service. Most are Caucasian, but the percentage of Negroes is higher than the percentage of Negroes in the Army.

At the time of their first court-martial, the performance record of the men is still surprisingly high. Most of them have had less than one Article 15 and less than one AWOL. Their character and efficiency ratings are generally the highest possible (4) and their CO's and NCO's continue to rate them only slightly below average in their past and future performance. It is also found that their commanders tend to rate these men higher than the MHCS staff does.

In social history, these offenders rate very close to average except in school adjustment where they fall below average. Their records are relatively free of signs of pre-service delinquency, partly because most of them come in service as soon as they are old enough, and so have little time in which to get into civilian trouble.

When the offenders are compared with a group of 232 average soldiers, the results found in Table II are obtained. The offenders are found to be young, less well educated, more apt to be Negro, more apt to be single, and more likely to be low in rank with less than 2 years service. Their character and efficiency are poorer and they have poorer performance records. The offenders and average soldiers do not differ in intelligence.

It was also possible to determine the type of offenses committed by the offenders. Table VI presents the results. Most of the offenses (92%) were military in nature. That is, the man was tried for an offense that is ordinarily not an offense in civilian life. Because there are many acts which the Army considers offenses that are not offenses in civilian life, there are many extra ways for a man to get in trouble in the Army and this may help account for the fact that a full 5% of all men at Fort Bragg receive a first court-martial each year.

B. Epidemiology of Offenses:

Since it was found that the personal characteristics of offenders differed from those of average soldiers, it seemed probable that the incidence of first courts-martial also varied among different sub-groups in the Fort Bragg military population. This possibility was investigated, using the sub-sample of 202 offenders and comparing it with the sample of 232 average soldiers. The results are shown in Tables VII, VIII, and IX.

It will be seen from Table VII that first courts-martial are most common among men under 21, and next most common among men with the rank of Private First Class or lower. On the other hand, first courts-martial are least common among men with the rank of Corporal or above. Offenses in the most delinquent group are nearly 9 times more frequent than among the least delinquent groups.

Tables VIII and IX show the first court-martial rates that were found among groups created by the use of two variables simultaneously. Here, rates as high as 179/1000/year were found among non-high school graduates under 21 while rates as low as 7/1000/year could be found among high school graduates with the rank of Corporal or above. The group with the highest incidence of courts-martial had a

TABLE II

Personal and Performance Characteristics of Offenders and Average Soldiers

First Court-Martial Offenders (FCM) (N=202) and Average Soldiers (AVERAGE) (N=232)

Characteristic	FCM Percentage	Average Percentage	Chi Square	Level of Significance
Volunteer	87.1	84.9	.27	N.S.
Draftee	12.9	15.1		
High School Graduate	24.8	40.5	11.40	.001
Non High School Graduate	75.2	59.5		
Negro	19.3	12.9	4.00	.05
Caucasian	80.7	87.1		
Married	21.8	42.2	19.61	.001
Single	78.2	57.8		
Over 24 months service	23.8	53.0	38.07	.001
Under 24 months service	76.2	47.0		
Rank E-3 (PFC) or below	85.1	45.3	72.70	.001
Rank E-4 (CPL) or above	14.9	54.7		
Age 21 or over	41.8	72.0	55.00	.001
Age under 21	58.2	28.0		

	Stand. Dev. FCM	Stand. Dev. Aver.	Mean FCM	Mean Aver.	Critical Ratio of Diff. Between Means
Rank (E-9 high, E-1 Low)	.96	1.68	2.73	3.99	9.8*
Age (years)	4.25	6.98	20.90	25.51	8.4*
Education (Yrs. completed)	1.58	2.02	10.12	10.90	4.5*
Length of service (mos)	34.69	68.95	26.20	64.60	7.5*
Character (4 best, 1 worst)	1.12	1.13	3.48	3.94	5.1*
Efficiency (4 best, 1 worst)	1.18	1.22	3.43	3.96	5.5*
AWOL's	.87	.44	.49	.12	7.4*
General Technical Score	15.65	18.38	99.21	103.44	.4

*Significance beyond .001 level.

TABLE III

Performance Characteristics of First Court-Martial Offenders

Characteristic	Mean	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases
CO Rating - Initial			
Past Performance (5 high 1 low)	2.74	1.02	454
Future Performance (5 high 1 low)	2.89	1.21	454
Potential Value (4 high 1 low)	2.58	1.10	454
NCO Rating - Initial			
Past Performance	2.83	1.23	454
Future Performance	2.96	1.23	454
Potential Value	2.54	1.09	454
MHCS Rating - Initial			
Past Performance	2.57	1.00	289
Future Performance	2.51	.98	289
Potential Value	2.69	1.09	289
Character Rating - Initial	3.48	1.12	455
Efficiency Rating - Initial	3.43	1.18	455
Articles 15 - Initial	0.64	0.95	455
AWOL's - Initial	0.49	0.87	455
Transfers - Initial	.27	.17	455
Sick Calls - Initial	.36	.28	455

TABLE IV

Social History Ratings of First Court-Martial Offenders*

Characteristic	Mean Rating	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases
Family Adjustment	2.82	0.64	261
School Adjustment	2.40	0.84	262
Work Adjustment	2.85	0.60	235
Pre-Service Delinquency	4.38	1.21	260
Marital Adjustment	2.95	0.94	93
Health	4.76	0.60	261
Military Record	2.90	0.74	252

Role Conflict	Number	Percentage
Yes	20	92.4
No	242	7.6
Total	262	100.0

Type of Court-Martial	Number	Percentage
Summary	286	66.5
Special	141	32.8
General	3	.7
Total	430	100.0

*The number of cases rated varies for each characteristic, partly because not all characteristics applied to each offender (e.g., marital adjustment) and partly because the social histories sometimes did not provide enough information to permit rating the characteristic.

TABLE V

Psychological Test Scores of First Court-Martial Offenders

Test	Mean	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases
Personal History Form OA-1	55.00	14.11	257
General Technical Score (GT)	99.60	13.52	453
MMPI - Pd Score	68.51	13.16	293
MMPI - Sc Score	64.06	17.75	293
MMPI - Ma Score	64.74	13.44	291

TABLE VI

Offenses Committed by First Court-Martial Offenders

Offense	Number	Percentage of Total
*Absent without official leave (AWOL)	135	60.3
*Disobeying order or regulations	26	11.6
*Insubordination to NCO's	14	6.2
*General offenses against military order	14	6.2
Larceny, wrongful appropriation	13	5.8
*Misbehavior as a sentinel	8	3.6
*Loss or misuse of military property	3	1.3
Escape from confinement	2	0.9
*Disrespect to officer	2	0.9
Assault	2	0.9
Drinking and reckless driving	2	0.9
*Desertion	1	0.4
*Drunk on duty	1	0.4
*Disobedience to an officer	1	0.4
	224	99.8

Breakdown of Offenses:

	Total	Percentage
Military Offense	205	92
Civilian Offense	19	8

*Military type offense

TABLE VII

First Court-Martial Rates Among Soldiers

with

Differing Personal Characteristics (One Variable)

Personal Characteristics	First Court-Martial Rate (Cases/1000/yr.)	Number of Cases*
All Soldiers at Fort Bragg	49.5	
Volunteers	51	176
Draftees	42	26
High School Graduates	36	50
Non High School Graduates	63	152
Negro	76	45
White	45	157
Married	26	44
Single	67	158
Rank E-4 (Corporal) or above	13	30
Rank E-3 (Private) or below	93	172
Age 21 years or older	26	75
Age under 21 years	111	127
Over 24 months service	22	48
Under 24 months service	80	154

*This is the number of First Court-Martial Cases in this category, out of a total sample of 202 cases.

TABLE VIII

First Court-Martial Rates Among Soldiers

with

Differing Personal Characteristics (Two Variables) (Selected High Rates)

Characteristics	FCM Rates (cases/1000/yr) Groups with Highest Rates	Number of Cases *
Negroes under 21**	243	21
Non H.S. Graduates under 21	179	101
Negroes; rank E-3 or lower**	157	37
Married; under 21**	148	13
Under 21; rank E-3 or lower	137	123
Negro; less than 24 mos. service**	125	32
Volunteers under 21	114	118
Non H.S. Grads; rank E-3 or lower	113	129
Under 21; less than 24 mos. service	112	112
Non H.S. Grad; less than 24 mos. service	111	115
Non H.S. Grads; single	110	120
Volunteer; rank E-3 or lower	109	146
Non H.S. Grads; Negro**	105	31
Volunteer; less than 24 months	98	128

*This is the number of First Court-Martial cases in this category, out of a total sample of 202 men.

**These rates are subject to large sampling errors because of the very small number of cases in this category in the sample of 232 average soldiers that was used to compute these rates.

TABLE IX

First Court-Martial Rates Among Soldiers

with

Differing Personal Characteristics (Two Variables) (Selected Low Rates)

Characteristics	FCM Rates (cases/1000/yr) Groups with Lowest Rates	Number of Cases
H.S. Graduate; rank E-4 or higher	7	7
Rank E-4 or above; under 24 mos. service	9	3
White; rank E-4 or higher	12	22
Married; rank E-4 or higher	12	17
Rank E-4 or higher; age over 21	13	26
Rank E-4 or higher; over 24 mos. service	14	27
Volunteer; rank E-4 or higher	14	30
H.S. Graduate; over 24 mos. service	14	11
Single; rank E-4 or higher	15	13
Age over 21; over 24 mos. service	16	33
Non H.S. Grad; rank E-4 or higher	18	23
H.S. Grad; age over 21	18	24
White; over 21	18	51
H.S. Grad; married	18	12

rate more than 25 times greater than those in the groups with low court-martial rates.

In general, offenses were infrequent among well-educated, married men of high rank, while they were very common among poorly educated, single men of low rank and limited service.

Not only did offense rates vary depending on the personal characteristics of the men, but they were also affected by the unit to which a man was assigned. The comparison made was between men assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division and men assigned to the other units at Fort Bragg. The results appear in Table X. It will be seen that the average first court-martial rate in the division was 69 cases/1000/year while it was only 36/1000/year among non-division soldiers. Nor was this entirely due to the fact that the division had more than its share of single young men. Even when men of comparable backgrounds were compared, it was found that men in the division were more likely to receive courts-martial (see Table X). For example, the high school graduate was more likely to be court-martialled in the division (53/1000/year) than if he was in a non-division unit (14/1000/year). Comparable but less striking differences were found when comparisons were made between men of equivalent rank, age, length of service, etc. It was thus apparent that the variations between units as well as variations in a soldier's personal characteristics affected the likelihood of his being court-martialled.

C. Effectiveness of The First Court-Martial Screening Program:

It has been noted earlier that each case was discussed by the MHCS staff and a recommended course of action proposed that was different for each case. Table XI indicates the actual recommendations that were made for the men in the two experimental groups. It will be noted, first of all, that no treatment was recommended for about one-third of the offenders. This was generally because they had committed a minor offense that seemed unlikely to occur again or because they showed no particular personality or environmental problems that seemed to require intervention by the MHCS staff.

It will also be noted that the percentage of men who were recommended for treatment, or not to receive treatment, or to be administratively separated, was approximately the same in both experimental groups.

Finally, it should be noted that 26 men in the actual experimental group failed to receive the help recommended, usually because they failed to keep two successive appointments made for them to come to the clinic. As will be noted later, the poor motivation of these men and their lack of a desire to be helped, proved to be one of the major obstacles to the success of the program.

The actual effectiveness of the program can be measured two ways. First, on 455 out of the 465 cases in all three groups (98%), information is available on their status 6 months after they were court-martialled. In addition, extensive follow-up data were obtained on the 309 cases who were still in service 6 months after their court-martial. Both of these types of data were analyzed. It should be mentioned that it was possible to get such a very high percentage of follow-up cases by corresponding with a man's new commander in cases where he was reassigned. The new commander provided us with the necessary follow-up information by mail. This opportunity to get essentially complete follow-up data represents one of the great advantages of conducting research in a military setting. Because the percentage of complete follow-up cases is so high, there is little likelihood of bias in the results and the data on the men who were followed up has been treated as if it were representative of the results achieved with all the men seen in the program.

TABLE X

Relationships Between Offense Rates and Personal

Characteristics in the 82nd Airborne Division and Non-Division Units

Characteristics	First Court-Martial Rate (cases/1000/year)	
	82nd Division	Non-Division
Volunteer	69	37
Draftee	68	31
High School Graduate	53	14
Non-High School Graduate	80	51
Negro	91	64
White	65	32
Married	33	22
Single	85	51
Rank E-4 (CPL) or above	20	10
Rank E-3 (PFC) or below	111	78
Age 21 years or older	34	21
Age under 21	122	102
Over 24 months service	29	19
Under 24 months service	96	66
Average Rate for all Soldiers	69	36

TABLE XI

Staff Treatment Recommendations and Actual Disposition

of First Court-Martial Offenders

	Numbers		Percentage	
Recommendation	Mock	Actual	Mock	Actual
Needs no help	52	62	34.7	41.3
Needs help	(89)	(77)	(59.3)	(51.4)
Received it	3	51	2.0	34.0
Did not receive it	86	26	57.3	17.4
Recommend administrative separation	9	11	6.0	7.3
	150	150	100.0	100.0

In the Actual Experimental Group, 51 out of the 77 recommended for treatment received it, while the remaining 26 (33.8%) did not.

Table XII shows the outcome on the men in the three groups. It will be seen that 341 (75%) of the men fell into the successful group and 114 (25%) of the men had been separated from the service for ineffectiveness or had deserted.

It is further evident that the men in all three groups performed with equal success during the 6 months follow-up period. That is, the status of the men in the three groups was not significantly different at the end of 6 months. This in turn indicates that neither the evaluation given men in both experimental groups nor the added help given men in the actual experimental group made any difference in their status 6 months after their offense. When the effectiveness of early screening is judged by the status of the offender 6 months later, it must be concluded that early screening and/or treatment was of no help. However, there is still the possibility that the men who remained on duty and received help performed better than those who remained on duty but received no help. This was investigated by comparing the performance records of men who stayed on duty in the actual, mock, and control groups.

The results are presented in Table XIII and they are discouraging. They reveal only two differences between the control and actual experimental groups that are statistically significant at the 5% level. It is found that, at the end of 6 months, commanding officers rate men in the actual group as having <u>less</u> potential value than men in the control group. In addition, men in the actual experimental group have <u>more</u> sick calls, but this is to be expected since each of their visits to the MHCS during the 6 months follow-up was counted as a sick call visit, so they should have more sick calls than control and mock group offenders who were not coming to the MHCS. When men in the control group and men in the mock experimental group are compared, no significant differences are found, nor are there any significant differences between the performances of men in the mock experimental and actual experimental groups. Judging both by rated performance and by objective indices of performance, there was no demonstrable benefit produced either by evaluating offenders or by evaluating and helping them. The possible reasons for this are analyzed in the discussion section of this report. Tables XIV and XV show comparisons between the control and mock groups, and the mock and actual groups.

D, Differences Between Offenders with Successful and Unsuccessful Outcomes:

It was possible to compare the men who performed successfully during the follow-up period with those who were administratively separated or deserted and were thus judged unsuccessful. The successful groups consisted of all Duty, ETS, and hardship cases, while the unsuccessful group was composed of the 208, 209, desertion, and 206 cases. These two outcome groups were compared with respect to the data obtained during the initial evaluation, which included their personal characteristics, past performance, social history ratings, and psychological test scores. These comparisons were made by combining the data on all the men in all 3 experimental groups. This procedure seemed appropriate since it had been shown that the final status of the men was the same in all 3 groups. Combining the data in this way made it possible to compare final status with the initial personal characteristics and initial performance of approximately 455 men (in a few cases data were missing for certain characteristics). The initial social histories and psychological test scores were compared with final status for approximately 300 men. The results are presented in Tables XVI, XVII, XVIII, and XIX.

It appears that offenders who remain on duty do not differ from offenders who fail to stay on duty with regard to their volunteer status, race, marital status, rank, age, education, or length of service. Thus, the variables which had been able to identify which soldiers were most likely to receive first

TABLE XII

Status of Offenders 6 Months After First Court-Martial

	G R O U P			
Status	Actual	Control	Mock	Total
Duty	101	104	104	309
ETS	7	14	8	29
Hardship	0	3	0	8
208	28	32	25	85
209	5	1	4	10
Deserter	5	5	6	16
206	3	0	0	3
Total	149	159	147	455

Chi Square=17.02, not significant for 12 degrees of freedom.

TABLE XIII

Performance Comparisons Between the Control and Actual Experimental Groups After 6 Months Follow-up

Performance Characteristic	Mean Value Control	Mean Value Actual	Difference	Critical Ratio of Difference
CO Rating				
Past Performance	3.26	3.15	.11	.69
Future Performance	3.39	3.22	.17	1.10
Potential Performance	3.19	2.95	.24	1.71*
NCO Rating				
Past Performance	3.27	3.23	.04	.25
Future Performance	3.40	3.26	.14	.93
Potential Performance	3.03	2.90	.13	.93
Character Rating	3.70	3.65	.05	.50
Efficiency Rating	3.72	3.66	.06	.60
Courts-Martial	1.06	1.04	.02	.36
Articles 15	.48	.64	.16	1.20
Board Actions	.04	.07	.03	.81
AWOL's	.76	.57	.19	1.46
Transfers	.21	.21	.00	.00
Sick Calls	.30	.37	.07	2.06*

*Significant beyond the 5% level

TABLE XIV

Performance Comparisons Between the Control and Mock Experimental Groups After 6 Months Follow-up

Item	Mean Value Control	Mock	Difference	Critical Ratio of Difference
CO Rating				
Past Performance	3.26	3.19	.07	.44
Future Performance	3.39	3.26	.13	.84
Potential Performance	3.19	3.14	.05	.36
NCO Rating				
Past Performance	3.27	3.22	.05	.31
Future Performance	3.40	3.33	.07	.44
Potential Performance	3.03	3.07	.04	.27
Character Rating	3.70	3.66	.04	.40
Efficiency Rating	3.72	3.67	.05	.50
Courts-Martial	1.06	1.04	.02	.40
Articles 15	.48	.67	.19	1.46
Board Actions	.04	.06	.02	.70
AWOL's	.76	.61	.15	1.07
Transfers	.20	.21	.01	.41
Sick Calls	.30	.32	.02	.62

None of these differences are statistically significant.

TABLE XV

Performance Comparisons Between the Mock and Actual Experimental Groups After 6 Months Follow-up

Item	Mean Value		Difference	Critical Ratio of Difference
	Mock	Actual		
CO Rating				
Past Performance	3.19	3.15	.04	.22
Future Performance	3.26	3.22	.04	.24
Potential Value	3.14	2.95	.19	1.27
NCO Rating				
Past Performance	3.22	3.23	.01	.06
Future Performance	3.33	3.26	.07	.41
Potential Value	3.07	2.90	.17	1.13
Character Rating	3.66	3.65	.01	.09
Efficiency Rating	3.67	3.66	.01	.09
Courts-Martial	1.04	1.04	-----	-----
Articles 15	.67	.64	.03	.21
Boards	.06	.07	.01	.31
AWOL's	.61	.57	.04	.31
Sick Calls	.21	.20	.01	.50
Transfers	.32	.37	.05	1.27

None of these differences are statistically significant.

TABLE XVI

Relationships Between Initial Personal Data and Final Status

Initial Characteristic	Percentages Successful Outcome	Unsuccessful Outcome	Chi Square	Level of Significance
Volunteer Status				
Volunteer	85.3	90.4	1.54	N.S.
Draftee	14.7	9.6		
Race				
White	80.4	81.5	.02	N.S.
Negro	19.6	18.4		
Marital Status				
Married	23.5	25.7	.00	N.S.
Single	76.5	74.3		

	Mean Value Successful Outcome	Unsuccessful Outcome	Critical Ratio	Level of Significance
Rank	2.72	2.59	1.30	N.S.
Age	21.5	20.9	1.44	N.S.
Education	10.1	10.1	----	----
Length of Service (months)	26.0	24.8	0.35	----

Relationships Between Initial MOS Classification and Final Status

Men Holding MOS with Initial Digit	Number with Successful Outcome	Number with Unsuccessful Outcome	Total
1 (Combat)	180	36	216
2 (Electronics)	10	4	14
3 (Electrical Maintenance)	16	9	25
4 (Precision Maintenance)	10	7	17
5 (Military Crafts)	14	11	25
6 (Motor Maintenance)	44	12	56
7 (Clerical)	29	10	39
8 (Graphics)	1	3	4
9 (General Technical)	27	12	39
0 (Special Assignment)	6	1	7

Chi Square=24.19; significant at .01 level with 9 degrees of freedom.

TABLE XVII

Relationships Between Initial Performance Data and Final Status

Initial Performance Characteristic	Mean Value Successful Outcome	Mean Value Unsuccessful Outcome	Critical Ratio	Level of Significance
CO Rating				
Past Performance	2.94	2.14	6.72	.001
Future Performance	3.11	2.29	5.90	.001
Potential Value	2.80	1.94	6.77	.001
NCO Rating				
Past Performance	3.04	2.18	6.83	.001
Future Performance	3.15	2.41	6.73	.001
Potential Value	2.73	1.97	6.50	.001
MHCS Rating				
Past Performance	2.73	2.11	4.31	.001
Future Performance	2.68	1.99	5.07	.001
Potential Value	2.87	2.16	4.44	.001
Character Rating	3.55	3.27	2.08	.02
Efficiency Rating	3.54	3.18	2.55	.01
Articles 15	0.49	1.08	5.18	.001
AWOL's	.43	.67	2.16	.02
Transfers	.26	.30	2.23	.02
Sick Calls	.34	.42	2.51	.01

TABLE XVIII

Relationships Between Initial Social History Ratings and Final Status

Initial Social History Rating	Mean Value Successful Outcome	Unsuccessful Outcome	Critical Ratio	Level of Significance
Family Adjustment	2.84	2.74	1.10	N.S.
School Adjustment	2.47	2.17	2.63	.01
Work Adjustment	2.90	2.71	1.96	.03
Pre-Service Delinquency	4.48	4.06	2.21	.02
Marital Adjustment	2.96	2.91	0.22	N.S.
Health Adjustment	4.81	4.61	1.70	.05
Military Record	2.95	2.75	1.48	N.S.

TABLE XIX

Relationships Between Initial Psychological Test Scores and Final Status

Test	Mean Value Successful Outcome	Unsuccessful Outcome	Critical Ratio	Level of Significance
Personal History Form OA-1	56.57	50.66	2.70	.01
General Technical Score (GT)	99.63	99.50	.14	N.S.
MMPI - Pd Score	67.7	70.8	1.75	.05
MMPI - Sc Score	61.7	70.9	3.56	.001
MMPI - Ma Score	64.6	65.1	.28	N.S.

courts-martial were not able to differentiate between the offenders who performed well after their first court-martial and those who failed to perform well and were separated from the service. There was, however, an interesting finding when a man's MOS was compared with his final status. It was found that the men with the moderately technical MOS's (those starting in digits 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9) were more likely to be unsuccessful then men in the combat arms (prefix 1). Some possible explanations for this finding will, be given in the discussion.

While initial personal characteristics generally did not differ in the successful and unsuccessful groups, their performance prior to court-martial did show significant differences. The unsuccessful group even before they were first court-martialled, had poorer CO-NCO ratings from their CO, NCO, and the MHCS. They also had poorer character and efficiency ratings, and more Articles 15, AWOL's, transfers, and sick calls. In short, their performance prior to trial was worse than that of successful offenders.

The ratings made from the social histories were also different in the two outcome groups. The unsuccessful group was rated as having a poorer adjustment in school, at work, in their health and in their record of pre-service delinquency. Here again, the potentially unsuccessful had a poorer record of past performance. On the other hand, whether or not a man's offense involved role conflict was not related to successful outcome. Nor was there any relation between the type of court-martial a man received and his final status. Those receiving the more serious special courts-martial performed no worse than those receiving the more minor summary courts-martial.

When psychological test scores were compared, the unsuccessful groups were found to have lower scores on the Personal History Form OA-1 and on the schizophrenic and psychopathic deviate scales of the MMPI they had higher scores. The groups did not differ in intelligence nor in manic tendencies.

It is thus found that successful and unsuccessful offenders do not differ in personal characteristics, but unsuccessful offenders do show a poorer performance record, a history of poorer social adjustment, and tendencies toward schizoid and psychopathic deviate behavior. Their attitudes are less favorable toward the Army and those who know them give them poorer ratings for past and future performance. In addition, men holding more technical jobs are most likely to be separated after their first court-martial.

E. Prediction of Performance after Court-Martial:

It has been shown that significant differences can be found in the past performance, social behavior, and test scores of unsuccessful offenders. This finding has both practical and theoretical implications that will be discussed later in this report. Another practical question arises: can any of these initial characteristics be used to predict which offenders will perform well and which ones will not? To answer this question, a series of cumulative frequency curves were plotted, one for each initial variable used in the experiment. For each score on that variable, the percentage of offenders that had that score or any lower score was plotted separately for men in the successful and unsuccessful outcome groups. The hope was to find cut-off scores on each variable that would identify a high percentage of unsuccessful offenders while indicating very low percentage of successful offenders. If such cut-offs were found, it might be possible to predict after a man's first court-martial whether or not his further retention in the service was desirable.

Not all of these cumulative frequency curves will be reproduced in this

report chiefly because most of them did not prove able to differentiate very well between successful and unsuccessful offenders even though statistically significant relations had been found between some of the variables and final outcome. To be specific, there was no useful relationship found between outcome and personal characteristics such as volunteer status, race, marital status, rank, age, education, and length of service.

It was also found that no practical prediction of outcome could be made from the objective measures of performance such as Articles 15, AWOL's, transfers, and sick calls, and the standard military character and efficiency ratings also show little effective differentiation between the outcome groups.

On the other hand, the initial CO-NCO ratings made by the CO's, NCO's, and the MHCS staff did show quite large differences between the successful and unsuccessful groups. That is, cut-off ratings could be established that would show a 30 or 35% difference between men in the unsuccessful and successful groups. The data in Tables XX, XXI, and XXII illustrate the findings. Table XX, for example, shows the ratings of past performance made by CO's, NCO's, and the MHCS staff. If a cut-off score of one is established, then on the CO ratings 39.5% of unsuccessful men are rated that low, while only 11.2% of successful men rate that low. The corresponding figures for an NCO rating of one are 38.6% unsuccessful and only 10.3% successful. An MHCS rating of one on past performance identifies 40.5% of the unsuccessful cases and only 5.6% of the successful cases. Comparable results are found with the ratings of future performance and potential value as a soldier.

If these tables were used, and an arbitrary cut-off rating of one was established, an average of 9.0% of the successful offenders would be rated this low on the average of the CO-NCO and MHCS ratings while 39.5% of the offenders would be that low, a difference of 30.5%. If a cut-off rating of one was used on the combined CO, NCO, and MHCS ratings of future performance, 7.9% of the successful cases and 38.8% of the unsuccessful cases would be identified, a difference of 30.9% and, if a cut-off rating of one was established on the averaged CO, NCO, and MHCS ratings of potential value, 8.8% of the successful and 42.7% of the unsuccessful offenders will be identified, a difference of 33.9%. That is, by setting a cut-off score of one on the ratings of potential value, it would be possible to identify 42.7% of the offenders with unsuccessful outcomes while misidentifying as potentially unsuccessful only 8.8% of those who do, in fact, turn out to be successful.

The cumulative frequency curves plotted for the social history ratings show moderate differences between those with successful and unsuccessful outcomes, but the differences are not large enough to be of much value and the tables are therefore not given herein. The social history variables that show the greatest differences between the two outcome groups are the work adjustment and military record.

The psychological test scores which differentiate the best are the Sc scale on the MMPI (where the maximum difference between the cumulative percentage curves is 27.2% at a score of 67) and the Personal History OA-1 scale (where a maximum difference of 23.1 is found at a score of 50). The cumulative frequency curves for the two tests are contained in Tables XXIII and XXIV. It is seen from these tables that both the Sc s core and the OA-1 score may be of value in differentiating unsuccessful and successful offenders, but the degree of differentiation is only moderate.

In summary, past performance and personal characteristics are not

TABLE XX

Prediction of Final Outcome from Initial CO-NCO-MHCS Ratings of Past Performance *

CO Ratings

Rating	Successful Outcome Number	Successful Outcome Percentage	Unsuccessful Outcome Number	Unsuccessful Outcome Percentage
1	38	11.2	45	39.5
2	115	33.8	72	63.2
3	244	71.8	100	87.7
4	302	88.8	109	95.6
5	340	100.0	114	100.0

NCO Ratings

1	35	10.3	44	38.6
2	110	32.4	69	60.5
3	228	67.1	100	87.7
4	292	85.9	109	95.6
5	340	100.0	114	100.0

MHCS Ratings

1	12	5.6	30	40.5
2	91	42.3	47	63.5
3	181	84.2	65	87.8
4	205	95.3	72	97.3
5	215	100.0	74	100.0

*The figures given are the cumulative number or percentage of men who have each rating (or any lower rating).

If a man is rated one on the MHCS rating, the odds are 5:2 that he will be discharged within 6 months.

TABLE XXI

Prediction of Outcome from Initial CO-NCO-MHCS Ratings of Future Performance *

CO Rating

Rating	Successful Outcome Number	Successful Outcome Percentage	Unsuccessful Outcome Number	Unsuccessful Outcome Percentage
1	25	7.4	44	38.6
2	80	23.6	63	55.3
3	236	69.6	93	81.6
4	296	87.3	109	95.6
5	339	100.0	114	100.0

NCO Rating

1	27	7.9	38	33.3
2	87	25.6	59	51.8
3	217	63.8	91	79.8
4	287	84.4	107	93.9
5	340	100.0	114	100.0

MHCS Rating

1	18	8.4	33	44.6
2	85	39.5	47	63.5
3	188	87.4	69	93.2
4	207	96.3	73	98.6
5	215	100.0	74	100.0

*The figures given are the cumulative number or percentage of men who have each rating (or any lower rating).

If a man is rated one on the MHCS scale, the odds are approximately 2:1 that he will be separated within 6 months.

TABLE XXII

Prediction of Final Outcome from CO-NCO-MHCS Ratings of Potential Value *

Rating	Successful Outcome Number	Successful Outcome Percentage	Unsuccessful Outcome Number	Unsuccessful Outcome Percentage
CO Ratings				
1	34	10.0	48	42.1
2	121	35.6	79	69.3
3	254	74.7	99	86.8
4	340	100.0	114	100.0
NCO Rating				
1	43	12.6	52	45.6
2	148	43.5	82	71.9
3	245	72.1	98	85.9
4	340	100.0	114	100.0
MHCS Rating				
1	8	3.7	30	40.5
2	103	47.9	50	67.6
3	131	60.9	57	77.0
4	215	100.0	74	100.0

*The figures given are the cumulative number or percentage of men who have each rating (or any lower rating).

If a man receives a rating of one on the MHCS scale, the odds are approximately 4:1 that he will be discharged within 6 months.

TABLE XXIII

Prediction of Final Outcome from Personal History OA-1 Score

Score	Percentage of Cases at this Score or Below	
	Successful Outcome	Unsuccessful Outcome
29 and below	2.1	10.3
30	2.1	11.8
31	3.2	14.7
32	4.3	19.1
33	5.3	19.1
34	5.3	19.1
35	5.9	19.1
36	6.4	20.6
37	8.5	20.6
38	12.2	23.5
39	13.3	27.9
40	13.8	30.9
41	14.9	33.8
42	15.9	36.8
43	17.0	36.8
44	18.1	39.7
45	19.1	39.7
46	21.3	41.2
47	22.9	45.6
48	26.6	47.1
49	28.7	48.5
50	29.8	52.9
51	32.4	52.9
52	33.5	52.9
53	36.7	52.9
54	40.4	55.9
55	43.1	58.8
56	47.9	60.3
57	50.5	63.2
58	53.7	67.6
59	59.0	69.1
60	60.1	73.5
61	62.8	73.5
62	64.9	76.5
63	69.7	79.4
64	72.3	80.9
65	74.5	82.4
66	76.6	83.8
67	78.7	83.8
68	81.4	83.8
69	82.4	85.3
70	85.1	88.2
71	87.2	89.7
72	90.9	89.7
73	93.6	91.2
74	95.2	91.2
75	95.2	94.1
76	95.7	94.1
77 and above	96.8	94.1

TABLE XXIV

Prediction of Final Outcome from Sc Score

Score	Percentage of Cases at this Score or Below	
	Successful Outcome	Unsuccessful Outcome
47 and below	12.9	11.8
48	17.5	13.2
49	17.9	13.2
50	23.9	17.1
51	28.1	18.4
52	29.0	18.4
53	35.0	22.4
54	38.2	23.7
55	43.8	24.9
56	45.2	26.3
57	49.8	27.6
58	50.6	27.6
59	53.9	30.3
60	54.8	31.6
61	59.4	34.2
62	60.4	35.5
63	62.2	39.5
64	65.4	40.8
65	69.6	43.4
66	71.4	43.4
67	73.3	46.1
68	73.7	48.7
69	75.1	49.9
70	76.0	51.3
71	77.8	53.9
72	78.3	56.6
73	79.3	59.2
74	81.1	60.5
75	82.5	61.8
76	83.4	64.5
77	83.9	64.5
78	84.8	64.5
79	84.8	64.5
80	85.7	64.5
81	85.7	64.5
82	87.6	64.5
83	88.5	64.5
84	88.9	64.5
85	89.4	65.8
86	90.3	68.4
87	90.8	69.7
88	91.2	73.7
89	91.2	73.7
90	91.7	74.9
91	91.7	74.9
92	92.2	78.9
93	92.2	80.3
94	92.6	82.9
95 and above	93.1	82.9

of use in predicting successful performance of duty, and ratings of social adjustment are of only slightly greater value. On the other hand, the CO-NCO-MHCS ratings of past and future performance do predict moderately well, and the Sc scale and OA-1 scores also are of some potential value as predictors.

DISCUSSION

A. Personal Characteristics of Offenders:

The characteristics of the offenders in this study are in close agreement with the characteristics described for other types of offenders both military and civilian, and the findings of this study amply confirm the work of others. The offender is young and shows the instability so common in youth. Moreover, there are few old offenders in the Army because repeated offenders are separated while they are still young. For the same reasons, few offenders have long service for their misbehavior is recognized early in their career and they are eliminated from the Army. The offender is typically single, partly because most young soldiers with limited service are single, and partly because people who are stable and mature enough to undertake marriage are more likely to stay out of trouble. The notable exception here is that the person who marries while he is very young is apt to marry as a sign of instability rather than stability and, in his case, marriage is accompanied by a greater risk of delinquent behavior.

The most striking finding is the relation between education and delinquency. Here, as others have pointed out, the lack of education per se does not lead to delinquency. Rather, the failure to complete school nowadays usually indicates either defective social adjustment or defective motivation and it is these qualities which first lead the man to do poorly in school and subsequently to do poorly in the Army. Since this is the case, sending such men back to finish high school may only give apathetic soldiers a chance to avoid their share of military duties, without producing any increase in their value to the Army. It is not more education which such men need. They need help in improving their motivation and social adjustment.

The finding of greater delinquency among Negroes is of interest, particularly since the Negro enjoys full social and legal equality in the Army. Several possible explanations may account for the higher rate of Negro delinquency. In previous studies, it has been found that the Negroes were less well educated, but in the present study, the Negroes were found to have as many years of pre-service schooling as the white soldiers. A second explanation may be that some Negroes come from social environments which may teach values that lead to trouble in the Army, such as a reluctance to comply with arbitrary authority, tendencies to act openly to gratify impulses, less than ordinary respect for property rights, etc. Such Negroes, who bring to the Army value systems in conflict with those of the Army, are apt to get into trouble in the same way that some Caucasian soldiers may come from pathological environments with antisocial values that lead them into trouble in the Army.

Another possibility may be that the great economic and social discrimination to which the average Negro is subjected increases the likelihood that he will hold resentment and hostility that may predispose him to difficulty in the predominantly Caucasian Army society.

Yet another possibility may be that the Negro in the Army is judged somewhat more severely than the white, with the result that he is more apt to be court-martialled for his offenses. Unfortunately, most of these

hypotheses about the reasons for greater Negro delinquency cannot be tested by the data obtained in this study, although a comparison of the social history ratings, performance ratings, and psychological test scores of Caucasians and Negroes might give some indirect answers to these questions. Unfortunately, time did not permit such an analysis.

There is little that is surprising in the fact that men of low rank receive the most courts-martial. The chief reason is that offenders and potential offenders are identified fairly early in their careers and so they are either eliminated from service or are not selected for promotion to higher rank.

It is also not surprising to find that offenders have poorer character and efficiency ratings, and more episodes of AWOL. Delinquent behavior has many manifestations and the same attitudes and character structure that lead to courts-martial are also apt to produce generally poor character and efficiency and frequent attempts to escape the obligations of service by going AWOL. What is surprising, however, is the considerable number of men who had relatively "clean" records prior to their first court-martial. Further investigation often revealed that these men actually had shown minor misbehavior, but not of sufficient severity to cause them to go AWOL or to cause their commanders to go to the special trouble of lowering their character and efficiency ratings. It was often found that the decision to court-martial a man was made not only because of the gravity of the specific offense but also because the man had a record of previous misbehavior which had been overlooked, and the instant offense was the culmination of many prior acts of delinquency. It was generally found that when a man had a poor character and efficiency rating he was a poor soldier but many other men with equally poor records still held the highest possible character and efficiency ratings, leading to grave doubts as to the validity of the character and efficiency ratings.

It is difficult to know the meaning of the data on sick calls, Articles 15, and transfers among offenders since no comparable data are available on average soldiers. In the same way, there is no way of knowing if the social history ratings and psychological test scores differed from what might have been found with average soldiers. It is known that the average soldier at the time of induction gets a higher (that is, better) Personal History OA-1 score than our offenders did, but our offenders were tested after their court-martial, at a time when many of them had hostile attitudes towards the Army that would lower their scores. It is also noteworthy that the offenders had scores on the psychopathic deviate, schizophrenic, and manic MMPI scales that were above the average of the general population.

The data can be summarized by stating that the characteristics of the offenders make psychological sense, in that they betray the presence of qualities of attitude, social adjustment, and past performance that make delinquent behavior quite likely. These men seem to possess many qualities that would cause trouble even in civilian life, but it is their misfortune, and the Army's, that these qualities are especially liable to cause delinquent behavior in the rather strict disciplinary system of the Army.

B. Epidemiology of First Court-Martial Offenses:

In making an attempt to control military delinquency, it is essential to know which soldiers are most likely to get into trouble. There are two reasons why this is so. First, a study of the characteristics of offenders often provides clues as to the reasons for delinquent behavior and

the things that must be changed to prevent delinquency. The data on the characteristics of offenders discussed in the preceding section provides us with valuable information concerning the causes and possible treatment of delinquency.

A second reason for obtaining epidemiological data is to identify the groups most likely to get into trouble so that preventive efforts can be focused where they are needed instead of being applied broadly and needlessly to the entire military population. In providing information for this second purpose, the need is to find variables which are simple and readily obtainable but which will effectively identify groups with high delinquency potential. The need for simplicity and ready availability tends to rule out both extensive social history taking and the extensive use of screening with psychological tests.

Fortunately, it was found that a few simple variables were very effective in identifying delinquent groups. The unit to which a man is assigned, and his volunteer status, race, marital status, rank, age, education, and length of service are all items of information that are routinely available and which turn out to have a relation to frequency of court-martial. By use of such variables, singly or in combination, it is possible to identify a group (Negroes under 21) with such a high delinquency potential that more than 24% of the members receive a first court-martial each year. The group of non-high school graduates under 21 has an average first court-martial rate of 18% per year, and this group provides one-half of all the courts-martial cases. On the other hand, it is possible to find groups such as Corporals and above with high school educations in which fewer than 1% per year of the men receive a court-martial. When there is this much variation in offense rates, it becomes both desirable and possible to focus preventive and corrective efforts on the groups that need it most.

The data in the present study suggest that the first step in dealing with delinquent behavior should be to identify those units with the highest court-martial rates and then to analyze the reasons for the high rate in that unit. In some cases, it will be found that the leadership policies and procedures of the unit are in need of revision. In other cases, it will be found that the operational requirements placed on the unit create unusual stresses that cause poor morale and misbehavior among the men. And, in some cases, it will be found that the unit, despite good leadership, is burdened with more than its share of young, single, poorly educated men with high delinquency potential. Once the location and causes of the delinquency are found, then preventive and corrective measures can begin.

C. Effectiveness of the First Court-Martial Screening Program:

At the time the FCMSP was started, the traditional method of dealing with offenders consisted of individual evaluation and treatment of the offender, with relatively little thought or attention being given to the social situation in which the offender lived and worked. The traditional methods were the ones used in the study and there was little contact or liaison with the unit except to get information and CO-NCO ratings concerning the offender.

It was shown in the results chapter that the men who were evaluated and helped did not perform any better than those who received no help and their status was no better at the end of their six months follow-up. Since this is a negative finding, it is important to understand why the FCMSP did not help these men. In general, the reasons fall into two categories: administrative and professional, and the problems in each category will be considered in turn.

1. Administrative Problems: This program was designed to provide offenders with prompt evaluation and treatment. By and large, however, this was not done for a number of very compelling practical reasons.

First, even though the MHCS saw only 30% of all offenders, the added work load was huge. Each case required from 6 to 8 hours of clinic time to be evaluated, at a time when the staff was heavily burdened with routine cases. The consequence was that these patients "swamped" the clinic, creating a huge typing load, and a heavy administrative burden. It would have been totally impossible to handle all of the offenders in this fashion. It is recognized that the experimental nature of the project led to a more extensive evaluation of each man than was needed just for clinical reasons, but it was the staff's opinion that routine evaluation of all first court-martial offenders was more than the staff could handle with the available time and personnel.

Second, it was very hard to arrange for prompt evaluation. Units were supposed to notify the MHCS as soon as they elected to court-martial a man but this rarely happened and most cases were not identified until their completed trial record reached the judge advocate's office several weeks later. Then a man's unit had to be visited for his records to be searched, and he had to be brought to the clinic for the testing and social history. The men were often unmotivated and frequently did not come or came late. Unit training and field work delayed the evaluation of other men. Once the men were evaluated, their records had to betyped and their case discussed by the staff, after which the man had to be seen in treatment by a staff officer, as soon as a vacancy developed in his patient schedule, which was often booked solid for a week or two in advance. There were so many occasions for delay at all stages of this procedure that the median time between trial and presentation of the case at the MHCS staff conference was 48 days. The average time was 78 days, the average being raised by men whose evaluation was delayed by AWOL, transfer, absences on temporary duty, etc. It was quite obvious the men were not receiving prompt treatment and the administrative problems of checking and re-scheduling missed and broken appointments was very great.

Another problem was that to have seen all first court-martial offenders would have increased the patient load by 52%. This was more than the staff could handle. The administrative difficulties that arose in the program were so great that the administrative problems alone would provide justification for not adopting a full screening program for every first court-martial offender. In addition, however, a number of professional problems emerged that raised doubts about the value of the program as it was operating.

2. Professional Problems: Once a patient was finally seen for treatment (which meant the staff felt he had a problem and might benefit from treatment), other problems arose. First, the staff members frankly doubted that character and behavior disorders would respond well to help and a large share of the offenders were in this category. This led the staff members to be rather pessimistic about the outcome of the ir work.

A second problem lay in the differing goals of therapist and offender. The offender often wanted help in escaping his military obligations and duties, while the therapist wanted him to accept these obligations and duties. The consequence was a frequent conflict regarding the desirable course and purpose of treatment.

A third problem related to the one just mentioned lay in the fact that many offenders saw no need for help or did not want it. The result was often

that an unmotivated, negativistic patient was being treated by an unmotivated, pessimistic therapist.

The fourth and most compelling problem was how to best help the offender. It was originally planned to treat the offender and not the unit. It became apparent, however, that offenders were highly influenced by the way the unit treated them, both before and after the offense. If an offender was being harrassed by his unit for his behavior (as was sometimes the case), there was little that could be done with the man in the clinic that could offset the harm being done by the way the unit handled him. Moreover, the great delay between court-martial and the man's treatment meant that for more than a month the man was being handled in a certain fashion by the unit without guidance from the MHCS and the pattern became so set that when the MHCS staff finally suggested a change in the unit's handling of the man the damage was already done. It should be pointed out, however, that in many cases the unit, acting without advice from MHCS, used wise leadership procedures to help and support a man after his court-martial. As a result, when he was evaluated by the MHCS staff, it was found he needed no further help. The point is, it was the consensus of the staff that a man's success or lack of it was generally influenced most by his character structure and the way the unit handled him, while the individual help provided by the clinic had much less influence.

In summary, it was found that administrative problems made it impossible for all offenders to receive prompt routine evaluations. Moreover, the type of help that could be given was of limited value professionally, partly because offenders are notoriously hard to treat, partly because they and the staff sometimes were not well motivated, and partly because it was found that the unit's handling of the man seemed to affect his performance more than the MHCS program did. It was hard for 2 or 3 sessions at the MHCS to add or subtract from what the unit was doing all day, every day, to help or to hinder the man.

D. Differences Between Offenders with Successful and Unsuccessful Outcomes:

It is of both theoretical and practical value to determine the differences between offenders who went on to serve successfully and those who did not. The practical value is that it may be possible to predict which offenders should stay on duty after their court-martial and which ones should not. In addition, however, it is important for theoretical reasons to determine why some offenders performed successfully and some did not.

It was evident, to begin with, that while characteristics like age and education were of value in identifying potentially delinquent groups, they did not answer the more subtle question of which offenders would be successful. It was necessary to turn instead to measures of performance, social history, and psychological test scores. The pattern that emerged was a very rational one psychologically. It showed that there was a consistency in behavior. Men who had performed poorly in the past, did poorly after their offense, no matter what method was used to establish the fact of their unsuccessful past performance. Objective performance criteria, CO-NCO-MHCS ratings and social history variables all showed a difference between successful and unsuccessful offenders, with the unsuccessful offender showing a significantly poorer past performance as judged by all of these criteria. The offense that led to court-martial was only one episode in a sequence of delinquent behavior that had existed prior to the court-martial and continued after it, being manifested by more AWOL's and Articles 15, more frequent transfers and sick calls, and a variety of other performance indices. The unsuccessful offenders not only had performed poorly in their military career, they had a poorer childhood adjustment in school, at work, in health, and in pre-service delinquency which seemed to produce in them the negative traits of character that

get them in trouble in the Army. In addition, they showed poorer attitudes towards the Army, and a greater tendency towards psychopathic and schizoid behavior which led them into difficulty. Here again, these findings made good psychological sense, in revealing that the character traits these men had are the ones which cause frequent delinquency in civil life as well as in the military.

E. Prediction of Performance After Court-Martial:

It has been shown that 25% of the first court-martial offenders were separated from service within 6 months, whereas a comparable figure for all soldiers would be that about 1% of them receive administrative separations at Fort Bragg in a 6 months period. It is obvious, then, that a man who receives a first court-martial has a much greater chance of being administratively separated from the service. There would be a considerable savings in time and effort if these ineffectives could be evaluated at the time of their court-martial and then separated from the service promptly if they are unlikely to perform well in the future. To do this, however, requires developing screening methods that will identify a large percentage of unsuccessful soldiers while giving the incorrect label of unsuccessful to as few potentially successful soldiers as possible.

In the attempt to develop screening variables, all the initial variables were compared with the final status of the offenders. The results are summarized in section E of the Results chapter. In essence, it was found that measures of personal characteristics and objective measures of past performance did not provide a practically useful difference between successful and unsuccessful offenders. On the other hand, ratings of social adjustment were of some value in predicting final status and the CO-NCO-MHCS ratings were of considerable value in predicting final status.

It may be instructive to consider why some variables were successful predictors and others were not. In the case of characteristics like age, rank, race, and education, the problem is that these are only crude and indirect measures of more subtle variables like maturity, competence, social values, and motivation, which are what really affect performance. Variables like education can distinguish the grossly delinquent from the average soldier, but they are too crude to make the more difficult distinction between successful and unsuccessful offenders.

The same problem exists with the objective measures of performance such as AWOL's, Articles 15, transfers, and sick calls. These again are only indirect measures of more basic factors such as inability to remain in stressful situations, minor acting out in a way that lead to transfer, and frequent use or exaggeration of illness to avoid duty and cope with anxiety. Moreover, these indirect measures are not pure and are affected by many extraneous factors. Some units are very quick to classify an absence as AWOL and some units use Articles 15 and transfers much more freely than others. Frequency on sick call is often affected by the policy of the dispensary medical officer, the availability of such care, and the tendency of a man to somatize his anxiety instead of acting it out.

On the other hand, the ratings of social history are designed to measure those specific aspects of a person's past history that may produce character traits that lead to delinquent acts. Here, the trials that affect delinquency are being rated in a more direct and unambiguous fashion. There are likewise a number of good reasons why the CO-NCO-MHCS ratings of past and future performance and potential value as a soldier worked out so well. First of all, the ratings were made at the time of the offense for the specific purpose of

evaluating the offender's past and future effectiveness. As such, they were the most direct and relevant measures of past and future performance that were available in the study. Secondly, the ratings were made by people who knew the man very well through frequent daily contact. Third, the ratings were global in nature and permitted the rater to consider all relevant available information about the man. This was especially noteworthy in the ratings made by the MHCS staff. At the time the MHCS staff did the rating, they knew the man's personal characteristics, his past performance as measured by objective indices, the ratings given him by his CO and NCO, the full details of his social history, and his performance on the psychological tests.

There is, finally, a very important practical reason why the CO and NCO could predict a man's future status: they were able to confirm their own prediction by recommending that the offender be kept on duty or administratively separated. It was frequently noted that, when a CO and NCO felt that a man would not do well, they arranged for that to happen, either by recommending him for prompt separation or by putting him on a further trial of duty under conditions so burdensome that the man was unlikely to succeed. On the other hand, if the unit liked a man or felt they could help him, they often went to great effort to keep the man on duty, often tolerating misbehavior that might have led to his separation if he had been in another unit. In many such cases, too, the man benefitted so much from the help given him by his unit that he stayed out of trouble thereafter. In either event, however, the unit's own actions helped being their prediction to pass. If they felt a man would do poorly, they often arranged it so he failed, while if they thought well of the man, they spent great effort in attempts to help him which were often successful.

The relationship found between the nature of a man's job (MOS) and his chances of performing successfully give further indication that successful performance is apt to be judged by the situation a man is in. It seems quite possible that men in technical jobs were more likely to be unsuccessful because their jobs were so demanding in nature that a marginal performance was more obvious andmore damaging in its consequences and therefore was not tolerated. On highly structured jobs with fairly objective standards of performance, a man who is performing at a borderline level may find it hard to get by. On the other hand, many combat related jobs are less structured and the acceptable levels of proficiency are harder to define, which may account for the fact that court-martial offenders who held such jobs had a greater likelihood of being kept on duty. Here again, it would have been helpful to compare the objective performance criteria of men in the technical and men in the combat-related jobs to see if the men in the combat jobs had poorer performance records during the follow-up period. Another possibility that needs study is to determine whether men in combat-related MOS's showed better records, better social histories, and better psychological test scores at the time of their first trial. This might help answer the question of whether or not combat MOS men were of better caliber and therefore more likely to do well. Still another possibility is that combat units may set strict disciplinary standards, leading them to court-martial men for minor offenses even though these men are of good enough caliber that they will continue successfully on duty. Men in the technical support MOS's, on the other hand, may be dealt with so leniently that, if one of them is court-martialled, it means he is so ineffective that he is very likely to be eliminated from the service in the near future.

It was also found that two of the psychological test scores measured qualities that could aid in the prediction of final outcome. When a man had poor attitudes toward the Army, and a poor past history, as measured by the Personal History Form OA-1, he was less likely to do well as a soldier. It was

also found that, if he had a high score on the schizophrenia scale of the MMPI, he was less apt to do well. Here again, these qualities of poor attitude, poor history, tendencies toward acting out, and difficulty in relating to people all contributed to an unsuccessful outcome in service.

The question remains, can these measures be of any practical use in predicting the value of keeping an offender on duty. The answer seems to be that they are of enough value to deserve more study than was possible in the current project. Several of the ratings, when used individually, were able to identify about 40% of the potentially unsuccessful offenders, while misidentifying only about 10% of the successful men as being potentially unsuccessful. It might have been possible to improve the efficiency of this prediction by using the combined rating an offender received from all raters. It might also be that multiple criteria could be used in making the prediction of final outcome by including some or all of the social history ratings and psychological test scores that were related to final outcome. It is unfortunate that time did not permit a further attempt to find multiple criteria predictors of final outcome.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The original purpose of this study was to determine whether the prompt application of customary evaluation and treatment methods to first court-martial offenders helped them to perform better than if they received no help. It was concluded that the screening program did not help these men. This was partly because administrative problems made it difficult to give prompt treatment, thus defeating the intention of the study. Indeed, the administrative problems created in the program were so great that it was concluded that a routine screening program for all first court-martial offenders was not feasible at Fort Bragg and the program was terminated in July 1961.

Moreover, a study of those cases which did receive treatment leads to the conclusion that individual treatment of offenders may not be the most effective manner of helping them or of reducing ineffectiveness in the Army. Many of these men either were relatively free of personal problems or were suffering from character and behavior disorders which are notoriously resistant to most forms of dynamic psychotherapy, particularly brief therapy, which is the only type feasible in the Army. It was therefore very hard, if not impossible, to change the character structure which might be getting a man into trouble. On the other hand, it was apparent that the way an offender was handled by his unit made a great difference in how well he performed and the job he held also affected his performance. This finding is in agreement with the general observation that offenders, many of whom have character disorders, are often lacking in stabilized internal values and controls, with the result that their behavior is apt to be considerably changed by the receptiveness or hostility of the environment they are in. In view of this, therefore, it began to appear that it might be more effective to help offenders by modifying their job or environment, including the leadership policy of the unit and the attitude of their buddies. Moreover, it seemed possible that it might be easier to change these environmental factors than to produce an effective change in the character structure of the offender. It seemed, therefore, that future efforts to help offenders might be more profitable if they involved intensive consultation with commanders, non-commissioned officers, fellow soldiers, chaplains, and others who control an offender's environment, while placing much less stress on psychotherapeutic efforts with the offender. This would eliminate many of the administrative problems created by extensive screening of each offender and would permit the professional staff to

employ its professional skills in consulting with command on practical, militarily useful ways of modifying a soldier's environment and the way he is led, in order to improve his effectiveness.

The First Court-Martial Screening Program produced a considerable amount of information that would be of value in such a program of consultation with the commanders, chaplains, work supervisors, and colleagues who act as "caretakers" of the offender and largely control his environment.

First, the study has confirmed and supplemented what is known about the factors that cause delinquent behavior. It is again found that age, education, race, marital status, etc., help identify potential delinquents but the underlying factors that produce ineffectiveness are traits like immaturity, instability, intolerance of authority, poor impulse control, acting out tendencies, difficulties in relations with people, and defective motivation. The offender tends to show a lifelong pattern of poor adjustment, starting with difficulty at school and work, proceding on to the offense for which he is court-martialled, and leading in many cases to eventual elimination from the service. Whether or not he gets into difficulty, however, depends at least in part on the environment he is in and the social pressures he is subject to with the result that a man's job and unit assignment will affect the chances of his being delinquent just as his personal qualities help influence his performance.

Second, the study has shown that it is possible to identify groups with high delinquency potential, using simple criteria like unit assignment, age, education, rank, length of service, race, and marital status. This permits working with the men with the greatest potential likelihood for getting into trouble.

Third, the study has shown that men with poor performance records in the past are most likely to perform in an ineffective manner in the future. This provides another way of identifying men with a potential for further misbehavior.

Fourth, the study has shown that it is possible to identify the men with the greatest likelihood of performing unsuccessfully after their first court-martial. It is not yet possible to predict poor performance after court-martial so accurately that a man can be recommended for separation right after his court-martial, but it is quite possible to identify men with the greatest likelihood of performing in an unsuccessful way. Once such men are identified, a decision can be made as to whether it is more profitable to give help to those with a high risk of further delinquency or to those with a low risk of further misbehavior. This is an improvement over a routine evaluation procedure which tends to give an equal amount of help to all offenders, regardless of their need.

Using the information gained in this study, it is felt an effective consultation program could be developed. It would begin with an epidemiological survey to identify units and personnel groups with high offense rates. Contact would be made with commanders of these units and assistance offered by the MHCS staff. The individual offenders would be evaluated, using the methods described in this report while a concurrent study is made of the units, leadership roles, operational missions, personnel policies, and other environmental factors that might contribute to high offense rates. By use of the criteria established in this project, plus what is known from the general literature on delinquency, men would be identified with high and low risks of further delinquency. Individual therapy would then be offered where indicated, but the greater emphasis would be devoted to consultation with the unit's commanding officers, non-commissioned

officers, chaplains, and other personnel, including, in some cases, the offender's buddies on how to deal with the offender and his misbehavior. The goal would be to modify both the environment and the character of the offender, with the modification of the environment being probably both more feasible and more profitable than modification of the offender.

It is felt that such a consultation program would be superior to a general screening program of all offenders for several reasons. First, the help would be given to those who need it most, or will profit most from it. Second, the help would be given more to the unit than to the man and, in the case of offenders, there is reason to believe this will be effective because the behavior of offenders seems very sensitive to changes in their environment whereas their character structure is very hard to alter. Third, this procedure would permit the MHCS staff to pass along their specialized knowledge about ineffectiveness to the commanders who must deal with the problem every day. This helps the unit not only in dealing with the present offender, but with others who become offenders in the future. Moreover, the commander and his staff become better oriented on ways of preventing or controlling ineffectiveness among all the men in the unit. The result of this consultation method would be to help an entire unit, instead of a few men in the unit.

In summary, it is felt that the First Court-Martial Screening Program has shown that it is professionally ineffective and administratively not feasible to conduct an extensive screening program of all first court-martial offenders. On the other hand, it seems quite possible that the problem of controlling military delinquency could be handled effectively by an active program of consultation between the MHCS staff and unit members. This consultation would be combined with a treatment program aimed at modification of an offender's environment where it is desirable or change in the soldier's personality when that is possible, or arranging for his separation from the service when a change in unit policy is unwise and an improvement in the man's performance cannot be induced. The study has also provided further information about the nature of ineffective soldiers, the factors that contribute to their ineffectiveness, and possible ways of predicting their future performance after their court-martial.

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MENTAL HYGIENE CONSULTATION SERVICE
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
First Court-Martial Screening Program
CO and NCO Rating Sheet

Case Number

Date

Name	SN	Grade

Initial	Follow-up	Months

Unit

The Mental Hygiene Consultation Service (MHCS) would like to have your opinion concerning the enlisted man in your unit whose name is given above. This information will be used by the MHCS to evaluate his past performance and future potential. He is being seen by the MHCS because he has been recommended for his first trial by court-martial, and the MHCS wishes to see if it can help him to make a better military adjustment. In deciding what kind of assistance would be most suitable, it is helpful to know what a soldier's immediate superiors think of him. At the bottom of the sheet, feel free to add any comments you may care to make concerning this man's past performance of future value and your recommendation as to whether he should be kept in the service.

1. How well has this man performed during the past six months, or since he came under your command (check one)

☐ 1. Poor ☐ 2. Below average ☐ 3. Average ☐ 4. Above average ☐ 5. Good

2. How well do you think this man will perform in the future (check one)

☐ 1. Poor ☐ 2. Below average ☐ 3. Average ☐ 4. Above average ☐ 5. Good

3. Check the statement which you think best describes the man

☐ Even if given help, this man will not become an acceptable soldier

☐ If given help, there is some chance this man will become an acceptable soldier

☐ If given help, there is a good chance this man will become an acceptable soldier

☐ This man is already an acceptable soldier and needs no help

4. How long has this man been under your command _____ months

5. Please add any comments you wish to make. (If desired, continue on reverse side.)

Rater's name	Grade and title

FB Form 1500-R (Test)
12 Jun 59 (ABCMD-MHC)

APPENDIX I

Part II

MENTAL HYGIENE CONSULTATION SERVICE
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
First Court-Martial Screening Program
Social History Rating Sheet

Case Number

Date

Name | SN | Grade

Unit

1. Family Adjustment

☐ 1. Poor ☐ 2. Below Average ☐ 3. Average ☐ 4. Above average ☐ 5. Good

2. School Adjustment

☐ 1. Poor ☐ 2. Below average ☐ 3. Average ☐ 4. Above average ☐ 5. Good

3. Work Adjustment

☐ 1. Poor ☐ 2. Below average ☐ 3. Average ☐ 4. Above average ☐ 5. Good

4. Pre-Service Delinquency

☐ 1. Much ☐ 2. Some ☐ 3. None

5. Marital Adjustment

☐ 1. Poor ☐ 2. Below average ☐ 3. Average ☐ 4. Above average ☐ 5. Good

6. Health

☐ 1. Poor ☐ 2. Below average ☐ 3. Average ☐ 4. Above average ☐ 5. Good

7. Military Record

☐ 1. Poor ☐ 2. Below average ☐ 3. Average ☐ 4. Above average ☐ 5. Good

8. Role Conflict

☐ Yes ☐ No

Type Role Conflict

Remarks

Rater's name | Grade and Title

Part III

FB Form 1500-R (test)
12 Jun 59 (ABCMD-MHC)

APPENDIX II

MENTAL HYGIENE CONSULTATION SERVICE
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
First Court-Martial Screening Program
Summary Data Sheet

Case Number

Date

Name | SN | Grade

Unit | Date of Birth | Age

Marital Status | Education | Race | Length of Service

MOS | Suffix

PULFES

	Initial CO	Initial NCO	Initial MACS	Follow-up CO	Follow-up NCO	Follow-up MACS
Past Performance						
Future Performance						
Potential						
Service in Command (months)						
Character						
Efficiency						
Court-Martial						
Article 15's						
Board Actions						
AWOL's						
Transfers						
Sick Calls						

Family adjustment (check one) ☐ 1. ☐ 2. ☐ 3. ☐ 4. ☐ 5.

School Adjustment ☐ 1. ☐ 2. ☐ 3. ☐ 4. ☐ 5.

Work Adjustment ☐ 1. ☐ 2. ☐ 3. ☐ 4. ☐ 5.

Pre-Service Delinquency ☐ 1. ☐ 3. ☐ 5.

Marital Adjustment ☐ 1. ☐ 2. ☐ 3. ☐ 4. ☐ 5.

Health ☐ 1. ☐ 2. ☐ 3. ☐ 4. ☐ 5.

Military Record ☐ 1. ☐ 2. ☐ 3. ☐ 4. ☐ 5.

Role Conflict (check one) ☐ Yes ☐ No

Role Conflict (Type)

Offense Civ Mil | Type GM

A. G. B Scores

VE			GO-A
Ad			GO-R
Fa			Es
Ma			CM
AGS			MM
ARC			CL
SM			GS
AI			RC
ET	CT		JN
NL	CM		AC

Personal History (A-1s

Otis RS 100 - AI 5

MMPI	St Sc	RS	ST	Sc	RS
?			Fk		
L			Mf		
F			Ha		
K			Pd		
Hs			Sc		
D			Ma		
Hy					

California Personality Inventory

	St Sc	RS	St	Sc	RS
Do			Tc		
Cs			Gi		
Sy			Un		
Sp			Ac		
Sa			Ai		
Wb			Ie		
Re			Py		
Sc			Fx		
Sc			Fe		

Form Action (check)

1.	2.	3.	4.
5.	6.		

Date of Court-Martial

Disposition

EM Discharged

FB Form 1500-R (Test)
12 June 59 (ACSBMD-MHC)

APPENDIX III

Part V